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1. Neoliberal empire: the case of Iraq from a theoretical and 
methodological perspective 
 
Research question: ‘neoliberal empire’ – privatization and marketing 
‘The real debate, then, is not whether to have an empire, but what kind.’ This quote 
derives from an article titled ‘American Empire, Not ‘If’ But ‘What kind?’’ written by 
foreign policy experts and diplomats James Lindsay and Ivo Daalder in 2003. In 2004 
sociologist and global studies expert Jan Nederveen Pieterse argued that the headline of 
the article sums up the drift of the American media at the time. This would lead Pieterse 
to tackle the question: What are the characteristics of the contemporary US American 
empire? Pieterse would address this question in a to this day relevant paper titled 
‘Neoliberal Empire.’ In this article Pieterse argues that a ‘Neoliberal Empire’ was now 
succeeding a process of neoliberal globalization, the prevalent regime of American 
economic unilateralism during the 90’s. This new ‘empire’ merged the practices of empire 
with those of neoliberalism. According to Pieterse, ‘neoliberal empire is a marriage of 
convenience with neoliberalism and indicated by the inconsistent use of neoliberal 
policies, and attempt to merge the America whose business is business with the America 
whose business is war, at a time when business is not doing so well.’1 Pieterse sees 
neoliberal empire as a combination of political-military unilateralism with economic 
unilateralism, ‘an attempt to merge geopolitics with the aims and techniques of 
neoliberalism.’2 Pieterse uses the occupation of Iraq to provide evidence for his 
argument.  
The shift that has taken place from neoliberal globalization to neoliberal empire, 
according to Pieterse, has had severe consequences for Americans. According to Pieterse, 
the cost of the United States pursuing primacy is that the United States had become an 
authoritarian and conservative society. The result of over-investment in the military is 
that the United States is now incapacitated in many other spheres. Pieterse sees a 
country that is undereducated, inward-looking, culturally backward, dependent on foreign 
borrowing and economically on its knees.3 Moreover, the reliance on the military-
industrial complex comes with an authoritarian culture of threat inflation and a 
stereotyping of the ‘rest’ of the world. Pieterse argues that the price of primacy is 
American authoritarianism and the disempowerment of Americans.4   
To me, Pieterse’s article provoked the question: What is its sequel? Pieterse’s 
article to me reads like a book that provides a definite answer to a story that remains 
unfinished. Pieterse talks about the shift from neoliberal globalization to neoliberal 
empire as a permanent one. The problem is that he doesn’t take into account that a 
trend may be reversible. A presidency and an administration do not last a lifetime. The 
Obama administration that would come to power in 2009 was run on a campaign of 
change, which provided the platform that won him his presidency. The question that then 
arises is: how does Pieterse’s framework of neoliberal empire apply to the Obama 
administration? Obama had made it clear in his campaign that he opposed the Iraq war 
from the beginning. Gary Jacobsen, an influential professor of political science 
specializing in congressional campaigns and election, makes the argument that Bush’s 
decision to invade Iraq may not have been sufficient to produce an Obama presidency. 
However, it was almost certainly necessary to produce an Obama presidency.5 According 
to Jacobsen, not only did the Iraq War help Obama win the presidency over republican 
nominee John McCain, it also helped him win the democratic nomination over Hilary 
Clinton. There was a widespread dissatisfaction among ‘normal’ democrats about George 
W. Bush and the Iraq War. Clinton had voted in favor of authorizing the Iraq war, while 
Obama had been opposed to the war from the start. And more generally, Clinton 
 
1 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, ‘Neoliberal Empire’, Theory, Culture and Society 21 (2004) 3, 119-140, there 123.  
2 Pieterse, ‘Neoliberal Empire’, 119. 
3 Ibidem, 137.  
4 Ibidem, 137. 
5 Gary C. Jacobsen, ‘George W. Bush, the Iraq war, and the election of Barack Obama’, presidential studies 
quarterly 40 (2008) 2, 207-224, there 207.  
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represented experience and continuity with the Democratic past and establishment, while 
Obama had run his campaign on the platform of change. This platform played well with 
Democratic constituency that wanted a fundamental change.6  
So, if Obama had been anti-Iraq war in his political career, then how does 
Obama’s becoming president and, more importantly, the installation of a new 
administration with a different perspective on the Iraq war, impact the framework of 
neoliberal empire produced by Pieterse based on the Bush’s administration’s geopolitical 
approach regarding Iraq? I want to examine if the concept of neoliberal empire is 
applicable to the Obama administration’s implementation of policy as it pertains to Iraq, 
since Pieterse used ‘the occupation of Iraq as a case in point.’7 The purpose of my 
research will thus be to test Pieterse’s research and contention. I will do this through an 
examination of the Obama administration’s presence in Iraq to account for the gap that 
currently exists in Pieterse’s research. By testing the relevance and applicability of 
Pieterse’s concept of neoliberal empire, the term itself will become more meaningful, as it 
is now not solely based on the Bush administration. In my opinion this adds to the 
possible validity of neoliberal empire as a theoretical concept.  
The last years have seen plenty of scholarly contributions about Obama and his 
policies regarding the war on terror. There has also been comparative research 
comparing Obama to Bush regarding this subject. However, nobody has approached this 
subject from the framework of neoliberal empire. In my opinion, it would be valuable to 
look at neoliberal empire from this perspective, since the hypothesis about neoliberal 
empire from Pieterse has been a valuable one for the concept of American empire that 
teaches us a lot about the driving forces behind United States foreign policy. In my 
opinion, this research could also be relevant in the current political climate in the United 
States: under the Trump presidency the political language has become more unilateral 
and direct, emphasizing the primacy of the United States with the slogan of ‘America 
First.’ 
The main question I try to answer is: To what extent can the Obama 
administration’s approach to the American presence in Iraq be seen as a continuation of 
Pieterse’s concept of neoliberal empire in Iraq, during both Obama administrations from 
2009 to 2017? The difficulty lies in testing Pieterse’s hypothesis. In his article, Pieterse 
establishes several key differences that indicate a transition from neoliberal globalization 
to neoliberal empire. I will however not focus on all these changes, since my thesis would 
then become too broad. The focus of my thesis lies on two key areas of change that 
Pieterse identifies between neoliberal globalization and neoliberal empire. The first is the 
heightened emphasis put on the politics of privatization. Privatization was also part of 
neoliberal globalization, but Pieterse argues that under the Bush II administration 
privatization is taken to new heights.8 He argues that the United States shift to combat 
mode in the wake of 9/11 ‘facilitated the authoritarian concentration of power, silenced 
criticism and widened the umbrella of ‘security.’ Neoliberal practices of outsourcing (to 
focus on core business) now extend to security and war.’9 I will therefore take a look at 
how military privatization manifested itself under the Bush and Obama administrations. 
The first sub-question is: how did military privatization manifest itself under the Obama 
administrations and can the policy implementation regarding military privatization be 
seen as a continuation of the Bush’s administration’s policy in this area? 
The other element I focus on, is the ‘marketing’ produced by the US governments. 
Pieterse argues that neoliberal warfare comes with marketing campaigns worthy of 
corporate causes. Pieterse argues that the Iraq war was carefully marketed as a ‘blow for 
freedom’ and that neoliberal business is characterized by an inverse relationship between 
marketing and the ‘product’, with more quality and effort going into the marketing than 
into the actual product.10 Both the politics of privatization for the US military in Iraq and 
the and the marketing efforts produced by the US government can be seen as part of the 
 
6 Gary C. Jacobsen, ‘George W. Bush, the Iraq war, and the election of Barack Obama’, 212. 
7 Pieterse, ‘Neoliberal Empire’, 119. 
8 Pieterse, ’Neoliberal Empire’,124.  
9 Ibidem,125.  
10 Ibidem, 129.  
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foreign policy produced by the US regarding Iraq. According to Pieterse, the U.S foreign 
policy changed fundamentally under the Bush administration going from an emphasis on 
uni-multipolarity, market conformity and financial and market discipline under neoliberal 
globalization to an emphasis on unipolarity, regime change and military discipline and 
economic incentives under neoliberal empire.11 I will focus here on the difference in 
marketing approach between the Bush and Obama administrations in assessing how 
Obama’s becoming president changed the message regarding the US military presence in 
Iraq. The second sub-question then becomes: In how far did the message from the US 
government regarding the US presence in Iraq change during Obama’s presidency? In 
other words, I will examine how US military presence was sold to the national and 
international public. 
The reason I chose these specific two areas of foreign policy is that I think that 
the ‘marketing’ frame regarding Iraq and the military privatization supplement each 
other well. The American foreign policy framing regarding the US presence in Iraq 
represents the public stance of the administration, where the politics of privatization 
represents a more hidden and private part of policy. In other words, foreign policy 
framing is explicit in nature, meaning that it’s the public stance from the administration, 
whereas the politics of privatization is more implicit in nature. I will examine how these 
two important areas of change fit in the Obama administration’s implementation of policy 
regarding Iraq. In other words I will take, just as Pieterse, Iraq as a case in point and 
examine if the implementation of foreign policy ‘marketing’ and politics of privatization by 
the Obama administration’s regarding the American (military) presence in Iraq indicate 
that the Obama administrations continued Pieterse’s notion of a neoliberal empire or if 
there were significant changes in these areas indicating a breach with neoliberal empire. 
 
Theoretical parameters: empire and hegemony 
My analysis tests Pieterse’s concept of neoliberal empire. When looking at the United 
States’ occupation of Iraq under the Bush administration, Pieterse saw neoliberal empire 
as a ‘marriage of convenience with neoliberalism and indicated by the inconsistent use of 
neoliberal policies, and attempt to merge the America whose business is business with 
the America whose business is war, at a time when business is not doing so well.’12 
Pieterse sees neoliberal empire as a combination of political-military unilateralism with 
economic unilateralism, ‘an attempt to merge geopolitics with the aims and techniques of 
neoliberalism.’13 Pieterse uses the occupation of Iraq to provide evidence for his 
argument. His new concept of empire should be placed in a significant bibliography 
centered around the concept of empire, and more specifically as it pertains to the US. 
This debate erupted in in the late 1990’s and led to new contributions by American and 
international relations scholars who construct universal political theories regarding 
empire while considering whether the United States can be perceived as one.14  
The reason that this debate became so important can be traced back to 1990’s 
with the emergence of the US as the ‘only superpower.’ After the Second World War, the 
international order changed from a plural international great power system, where 
interstates relations were governed by rules – most notably non-interference in each 
other’s internal affairs and a clear-cut distinction between war and peace – to a two 
superpower system.15 The end of the Soviet-Union and the overwhelming military 
superiority of the US ended this power-system. According to Hobsbawm, the strength of 
the US in high-tech offensive warfare makes it the only state capable of military action in 
any part of the world on short notice. Hobsbawm states that 9/11 ‘has enabled a group 
 
11 Ibidem, 130.  
12 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, ‘Neoliberal Empire’, Theory, Culture and Society 21 (2004) 3, 119-140, there 123.  
13 Pieterse, ‘Neoliberal Empire’, 119. 
14 April Renee Biccum, ‘What is an Empire? Assesing the postcolonial contribution to the American Empire 
debate’, International journal of postcolonial studies 20 (2018) 5, pp. 697-716. 
15 Eric Hobsbawm, ‘War, peace and hegemony at the beginning of the twenty-first century’, in: Chandra Chari 
(eds.): War, peace and hegemony in a globalized world. The changing balance of power in the twenty-first 
century (London 2007) pp. 15-24, there 21.  
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of political crazies to realize long-held plans for an unaccompanied solo performance of 
world supremacy.’16 
The idea of American empire has now become common currency and is widely 
used in both academic and political circles. However, whether empire is actually a useful 
term to describe the role of the US today, remains a fiercely debated question.17 
According to Charles-Phillippe David, empire and hegemony have different meanings. 
Empire has a territorial dimension and comes with the implication of control over 
subjects, whereas hegemony refers to more informal means of subjugation and 
persuasion over other international actors. Hegemony can be considered more liberal and 
institutional as opposed to empire, which has more pragmatic and military 
connotations.18 The terms are often used interchangeably in contemporary popular 
discourse. When used more specifically, however, they allow us to trace significant 
differences in the US hegemony exercised by the Clinton administration and Bush’s idea 
of US empire.19 Indeed, one of the central topics of the empire debate is whether the US 
is more accurately described as a hegemony than as an empire.20  
The concept of hegemony derives from Antonio Gramsci, the Marxist theorist, to 
refer to ideological or cultural processes. However, many scholars today translate the 
concept as an economic matter. In their case, a hegemon is a state that enjoys relative 
preponderance over the world economy.21 Many theorists argue that the term hegemony 
is better way to describe the role of the US. According to them, hegemony has the 
capacity to encompass the Gramscian concept of consensus and persuasion, while 
simultaneously highlighting the role of military power and coercion in the evolution of US 
foreign policy.22 Accordingly, scholars such as John Agnew and Andrew Hurrel, make the 
argument for the use of hegemony instead of empire. They argue that hegemony is a 
less ‘intrusive mode of control’ than empire and is better describing the power exercised 
by the U.S in contemporary foreign politics.23  
Hegemony and empire are both terms that are ‘essentially contested’.24 The rules 
for defining or applying the term are more ambivalent, then, and no common 
understanding exists about the core components of the concepts. Accordingly, Nexon and 
Wright, for instance, state that empires are notoriously difficult to define and that the 
political communities referred to as empire differ a great deal from one another.25 In fact, 
a wide variation exists in types or forms of empire. Moreover, as Biccum argues, the 
meaning of the word empire has changed over time, and is used both analytically and 
politically.26 Still, a distinction that is often made is between the formal (direct) and 
informal (indirect) ways of exercising power.27 Formal imperialism represents direct 
territorial rule. In this case, the empire annexes foreign land and declares official control 
over it, while subordinating the local population. The newly acquired territory then turns 
into a colony or dependency. However, the inhabitants of the colony do not enjoy the 
same rights or privileges as the citizens of the colonizers’ home country.28 Formal 
empires thus have direct control over the inhabitants of the subjugated territory, while 
 
16 Hobsbawm, ‘War, peace and hegemony at the beginning of the twenty-first century, 21. 
17 Charles-Phillippe David, ‘Revisiting US hegemony/empire’, in: Charles-Phillipe David and David Grondin (eds), 
Hegemony or Empire. The redefinition of US power under George W. Bush (Hampshire 2006) pp. 219-225, 
there 219.  
18 David, ‘Revisiting US hegemony/empire’, 219. 
19 Ibidem, 219. 
20 David Grondin, ‘Coming to terms with America’s liberal hegemony/empire’, in: Charles-Phillipe David and 
David Grondin (eds), Hegemony or empire. The redefinition of US power under George W. Bush (Hampshire 
2006) pp. 1-20, there 1. 
21 Julian Go, Patterns of empire. The British and American empires, 1688 to the present (Cambridge 2011) 8.  
22 Grondin, Coming to terms with America’s liberal hegemony/empire’, 2. 
23 Andrew Hurrel, ‘Pax Americana or the empire of insecurity’, International relations of the Asia-Pacific 5 
(2005) pp. 153-176, there 153.  
24 Miriam Prys and Stefan Robel, ‘Hegemony not empire’, Journal of international relations and development 14 
(2011) pp. 247-279, there 254. 
25 Daniel H. Nexon and Thomas Wright, ‘What’s at stake in the American Empire debate’, the American political 
science review 101 (2007) 2, pp.253-271, there 258.  
26 Biccum, ‘What is an empire? Assessing the postcolonial contribution to the American Empire debate’, 706. 
27 Go, Patterns of empire, 9. 
28 Ibidem, 10. 
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the inhabitants of this territory become inferior citizens. Partha Chatterjee has named 
this the ‘rule of colonial difference.’29 In this context, it is important to make a distinction 
between imperialism and empire. David Abernethy defines imperialism as ‘the process of 
constructing an empire.’30 Indeed, imperialism often leads to empire, but this doesn’t 
necessarily have to be the case, as Bruce Parrot notes. An imperialist foreign policy can 
fail due to the resistance of a ‘targeted’ local population or due to the balancing behavior 
of other great powers.31 
An example of formal imperialism is the British empire that also exercised control 
over societies that were not formally colonies. Michael Doyle argues that ‘if enough of the 
articulation of interests in a peripheral state can be influenced, the aggregation of 
coalitions will be controlled; and if aggregation is thoroughly shaped, sovereign decisions 
will be controlled.’32 This is where the concept of ‘informal empire’ comes into play. 
‘Informal empire’, refers to the exercise of power of both internal and external affairs of 
‘officially’ independent states by a variety methods minus the actual annexation.33 The 
methods of an informal imperial state can be diverse ranging from offering money, 
access, protection and other resources in exchange for the deference of the dependent 
society.34 With respect to both the formal and informal version, Go argues that we must 
not be too stark in our distinctions. He believes formal and informal empire can be better 
thought of as two ends in a blurry continuum. In some cases or moments in time, both 
might me be hardened and rigid as distinct types, but not always. Apparently, empires 
can take a variety of forms and modalities and have a large repertoire of methods, 
techniques and tactics that can be used establish, extend and maintain themselves.35 The 
distinction between formal and informal empire is just one of the important distinctions 
that can be made in the debate surrounding the concept of empire.  
Whether the US is in fact an empire hinges on whether empire should be defined 
in broad or narrow terms. 36 A more narrow definition of empire would emphasize it as 
the sovereign political control over another political entity. An example of this is the 
definition of Michael Doyle, who defines empire as ‘effective control, whether formal or 
informal, of a subordinated society by an imperial society.’37 A broader definition of 
empire concerns more a general imbalance in influence and power. For Charles Maier, for 
example, empire is just an ‘inequality of power resources and influence.’38  
Paul MacDonald attempts to give structure to the American empire debate by 
dividing the various scholars into three main categories. The first and most notable group 
is labelled as imperial enthusiasts. To them the US can and should be considered an 
empire and they consider this to have a positive effect for US citizens, but also for the 
rest of the world.39 The second group of authors consists of imperial critics. These 
authors accept the notion of American empire, but believe that this will lead to harmful 
global consequences.40 And lastly, the third group of authors consists of imperial sceptics. 
These authors don’t see the US as an empire and consider that the strategy the US 
employs are fundamentally anti-imperial in nature. They do accept that the US has 
overwhelming military and economic capabilities, however they argue that there are 
 
29 Partha Chatterjee, The nation and its fragments. Colonial and postcolonial histories (Princeton 1993) 14.  
30 David B. Abernethy, The dynamics of global dominance. European overseas empires 1415-1980 (Yale 2000) 
21.  
31 Bruce Parrot, ‘Analyzing the transformation of the Soviet Union in comparative perspective’, in: Karen 
Dawisha and Bruce Parrot (eds), The end of empire? (New York 1997) pp. 3-30, there 8. 
32 Michael Doyle, Empires (Ithaca 1986) 37.  
33 Ibidem, 10-11. 
34 Ibidem, 11.  
35 Go, Patterns of empire, 11.  
36 Ibidem, 50.  
37 Doyle, Empire, 30. 
38 Charles S. Maier, ‘An American Empire? The problems of frontiers and peace in twenty-first century world 
politics’, Harvard magazine (2002) pp.1-4, there 1. 
39 Paul K. MacDonald, ‘Those who forget historiography are doomed to republish it: empire, imperialism and 
contemporary debates about American power’, Review of international studies 35 (2009) pp.45-67, there 48. 
40 Ibidem, 49.  
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many restrictions in place that prevent the US from acting imperially.41 Nederveen 
Pieterse belongs to the group of imperial critics. 
Nederveen Pieterse situates himself within the American empire debate by 
arguing for an hybrid form of empire that combines features of neoliberal globalization 
with features of empire.42 Though some have argued that neoliberal globalization equates 
to empire, Pieterse is not of that opinion. He describes contemporary globalization as a 
package deal that includes flexibilization (destandardization in the organization of labor 
and product), informatization (applications of information technology), and various other 
changes such as regionalization and reconfiguration of states.43 Beginning in the 1980’s, 
the growing impact of neoliberal policies have added to the globalization package, 
marketization (the unleashing of market forces), deregulation (privatization, 
liberalization), financialization and securitization (conversion of assets into tradable 
financial instruments), combined with an ideology of lean government.44 On the basis of 
this, Pieterse distinguishes between neoliberal globalization and neoliberal empire. 
Neoliberal globalization centers around economics and finance, whereas neoliberal 
empire hinges on geopolitics and military and political power.45  
The new empire Pieterse identifies is universalistic: ‘Universalistic empires, in their 
dominant political culture do not recognize other polities as legitimate equals’, another 
way of putting this is ‘empire without end.’46 This notion derives from Virgil’s Aeneid, 
which is a key text on Roman identity. In it, Jupiter (god of sky and thunder, king of the 
gods) promises the Romans imperium (power), from which empire is derived, meaning 
power without limits of time or space.47 Whereas the Roman and the British Empires 
brought the rule of law as the basis of their claim to constitute a ‘Pax,’48 and neoliberal 
globalization was rule-based, neoliberal empire is not, so Pieterse argues. Neoliberal 
empire is founded on the rule of power. With respect to this, Pieterse points out that the 
US ‘does not endorse the International Criminal Court, claims preemption from its 
mandate American nationals, and uses this in negotiation trade and aid’. He argues, that 
these features are encoded in the Bush Doctrine. The phrase: ‘Either you are with us. Or 
you are with the terrorists’, sets the term for universalism, whereas the threat of 
preventive strike places the US outside international law.49  
Pieterse’s new empire is kaleidoscopic in its nature and deploys the full register of 
power: military, political, financial, economic and ideological.50 It combines the practices 
of empire with those of neoliberalism. The merger of both results in a, what Pieterse 
dubs, osmosis of neoliberalism and empire.51 This is clearly not a formal but informal 
kind of empire. 
  
Methodology and case – Iraq 
I make use of a case study as methodological approach by employing a comparative 
analysis between the Bush and Obama administrations and using Iraq, just as Pieterse, 
as a case in point. A case study entails an intensive study regarding a person, group of 
people or a unit that is aimed to generalize over several units. Another, similar, way to 
describe a case study is that is ‘an analysis of systems that are studied with a 
comprehensive view by either one or several methods.’52 Jamie Baxter argues that a case 
study ‘involves the study of a single instance or small number of instances of a 
phenomenon in order to explore in-depth nuances of the phenomenon and the contextual 
 
41 Ibidem, 49.  
42 Pieterse, Globalization or empire, 39. 
43 Pieterse, Globalization or empire, 1.  
44 Ibidem, 1. 
45 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization or empire? (New York 2005) 32. 
46 Ibidem, 43 
47 Neville Morley, The Roman empire. Roots of imperialism (London 2010) 13. 
48 Pieterse, Globalization or empire, 43.  
49 Ibidem, 43.  
50 Ibidem, 43. 
51 Ibidem, 45. 
52 Johanna Gustaffson, ‘Single case studies vs. multiple case studies: a comparative study’, (12 January 2017) 
http://hh.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1064378/FULLTEXT01.pdf (10 April 2020), pp. 1-15, there 2. 
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influences on and explanations of that phenomenon.’53 And Orum et al. define a case 
study as an ‘in-depth, multifaceted investigation using qualitative research methods, of a 
single social phenomenon.54 In a case study the nature of a the social phenomenon 
researched can be diverse. It can be an organization; it can be a city; it can be a role; or 
role-occupants; or an entire group of people.55 A case can also be a single instance or 
data point, such as a survey respondent, a subject in an experiment, or the non-
occurrence of war between belligerents.’56 A case can also be uniquely historically or 
geographically bound, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or the Watts riots.57 
This also goes for my case, the U.S occupation of Iraq, which is historically and 
geographically bound. 
Baxter and Jack argue that multiple case studies can be expensive and time 
consuming.58 Moreover Siggelkow argues that ‘the existence of a phenomenon can 
opulently be described by single case studies’59, whereas Dyer and Wilkins argue that 
single case studies produce better and more extensive theory as opposed to multiple 
case studies.60 Given the limit of this thesis, a fully worked out elaboration of ‘neoliberal 
empire’ would be too much. Another important reason to choose for a single case 
methodology is that Pieterse builds his argument on Iraq, using it as a ‘case in point.’ 
Testing his theory on the same unit (Iraq) but under a different variable (administration), 
is more promising than testing it with another unit, since Pieterse also emphasizes the 
distinctiveness of the Iraq occupation as a paradigm of his larger theory about neoliberal 
empire.   
I apply a comparative analysis between the Obama and Bush administrations, 
researching continuity and change to contribute to a better, or more comprehensive 
theory as it pertains to neoliberal empire. The comparative method is a preferred 
strategy for social and political scientist in their researching institutions or macropolitical 
phenomena, with the macro political unit of analysis being, in this case, the invasion of 
Iraq and installation of a new government.61 Arend Lijphart argues for six different types 
of approaches to case-oriented comparative research: the atheoretical case study; the 
interpretive case study; the hypothesis-generating case study; the theory-confirming or 
theory-infirming case study; and the deviant case analysis.62 My research fits best 
Lijphart’s notions of theory-confirming or theory infirming, since a single case is 
examined, here, within a framework of established generalizations. The established 
generalizations in this case are the elements of Pieterse’s definition of neoliberal empire. 
My goal is to test Pieterse’s theory and see whether my research either confirms or 
infirms it and to what extent. Similar to Lijphart, Harry Eckstein distinguishes between 
five different types of case oriented studies that can be used in comparative analysis: 1. 
configurative-idiographic; 2. disciplined-configurative; 3. heuristic case study; 4. 
plausibility probes; 5. crucial case study.63 The type I employ for my research is 
disciplined configurative, because I am testing an already existing theory by using Iraq 
during the Obama administration as my case study. 
 
53 Jamie Baxter, ‘Case studies in qualitive research’, in: Qualitive research methods in in human geography 
(eds. Iain Hay) pp. 81-98, there 81.  
54 A. M. Orum, J.R. Feagin and G. Sjoberg, ‘Introduction: the nature of the case study’, in: J.R. Feagin, A.M. 
Orum and G. Sjoberg (eds), a case for the case study (1991), pp. 1-26, there 2.  
55 Orum, ‘Introduction: the nature of the case study’, 2. 
56 Juliet Kaarboo, ‘A practical guide to the comparative case study method in political psychology’, Political 
psychology 20 (1999) 2, pp. 369-391, there 372. 
57 Kaarboo, ‘A practical guide to the comparative case study method in political psychology’, 372. 
58 P. Baxter and S. Jack, ‘Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for Novice 
Researchers. The Qualitative Report 13(4), pp. 544-556, there.  
59 Gustaffson, ‘Single case studies vs. multiple case studies: a comparative study’, 3, 
60 W.G. Dyer and A.L. Wilkins Jr. and K.M. Eisenhardt, ‘Better stories, not better constructs, to generate better 
theory: A rejoinder to Eisenhardt; better stories and better constructs: The case for rigor and comparative 
logic. The Academy of Management Review, 16(3), pp. 613-618, there 618.  
61 Donatella Della Porta, ‘Comparative analysis: case-oriented versus variable-oriented research’, in: Donatella 
Della Porta and Michael Keating (eds, )Approaches and methodologies in the social sciences. A pluralist 
perspective (2008), pp . 198-222, there 202. 
62 Ibidem, 692.  
63 Harry Eckstein, ‘Case study and theory in political science’, in: Robert Gromm, Martin Hammersley and Peter 
Foster (eds), : Case study method: key issues, key texts (London 2000) pp. 119-164, there 132-133. 
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According to Flyvvberg, one common misunderstanding about case studies is that 
the case study method is most useful for generating hypotheses.64 Instead, Eckstein 
argues that ‘case studies are valuable at all stages of the theory-building process, but 
most valuable at that stage of theory-building where least value is generally attached to 
them: the stage at which candidate theories are tested.’65 In relation to this, Flyvvberg 
argues that the testing of hypotheses directly relates to the question of ‘generalizability’, 
which in turns relates to the question of case selection.66 The generalizability of cases can 
be increased by the strategic selection of cases. Here, Flyvvberg distinguishes between 
two categories of strategies in order to select samples for research: 1. random selection; 
2. information-oriented selection.67  I use information-oriented selection, since I focus on 
a single case study, and both the case and it’s subcategories have been selected based 
on the expectations about their information content. The category of information-
oriented selection can be divided, in turn, into four subcategories: a.) extreme/deviant 
cases; b.) maximum variation cases; c.) critical cases; d.) paradigmatic cases.68 My 
research fits in Flyvvberg’s subsections of both critical and paradigmatic cases, because 
Nederveen Pieterse uses Iraq as ‘a case in point’ that permits him the deduction of a type 
whereas at the same time this case is paradigmatic. I work the other way around: I use 
Iraq as a paradigmatic case in order to critically assess its typicality. 
I employ predominantly a qualitative approach and partly a quantitative approach. 
Quantitative research can be defined as research that explains phenomena according to 
numerical data which are then analyzed by means of mathematically based methods. 
One of the most used methods is statistical analysis.69 From a broader perspective, 
quantitative research can be defined as a type of empirical research into a human 
problem or social phenomenon by using a theory consisting of variables, which are 
measured with numbers and analyzed by using statistics in order to determine whether 
the theory can explain or predict phenomena and interests.70’In my case this consists in 
comparing data about private military contributions, in consecutive years, taking into 
account the US citizenship of actors etc.  
Qualitative research is deemed more difficult to define. According to Hitchcock and 
Hughes, this derives from its multifaceted nature and different paradigms.71 Still, Strauss 
and Corbin provide the following definition: ‘By the term ‘qualitative research’ we mean 
any type of research that produces findings not arrived by statistical procedures or other 
terms of quantification.’72 According to Yilmaz, this definition is simplistic since it focusses 
on techniques and procedures that are used in order to collect and analyze data, 
meanwhile other aspects of research design are ignored. Another problem with Strauss 
and Corbin’s definition is that it defines qualitative research from a quantitative 
perspective instead of focusing on its own characteristics.73  Drawing on recent 
literature,74 Yilmaz defines it as an ‘emergent, inductive, interpretive and naturalistic 
approach to the study of people, cases, phenomena, social situations and processes in 
their natural settings in order to reveal in descriptive terms the meanings that people 
attach to their experiences of the world.’75 Denzin and Lincoln argue that qualitative 
research privileges no single methodological practice over another, it does not belong to 
 
64 Bent Flyyvberg, ‘Five misunderstandings about case-study research’, in: Clive Seale et al. (eds), Qualitative 
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67 Ibidem, 395-396. 
68 Ibidem, 396-397.  
69 Kaya Yilmaz, ‘Comparison of quantitative and qualitative research traditions: epistemological, theoretical, and 
methodological differences’, European journal of education 48 (2013) 2, pp. 311-325, there 311. 
70 Yilmaz, ‘Comparison of quantitative and qualitative research’, 311.  
71 Ibidem, 311. 
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a single discipline and it has no theory or paradigm that is distinctly its own.76 Qualitative 
research ‘draws on philosophical ideas in phenomenology, symbolic interactionism, 
hermeneutics and other traditions to support the attention on ‘quality’ rather than 
‘quantity’.’77  
In comparison to quantitative research, qualitative research has struggled to 
legitimize itself. It’s focus on social meanings is often been seen as less reliable in 
comparison to numerical data, by the preference of governments, policy makers and 
other users that prefer ‘hard facts.’ In popular culture preference and authority has often 
been given to numbers, ‘with meanings appearing ephemeral and elusive.’78 Snape and 
Spencer state that ‘providing a precise definition of qualitative definition is no mean 
feat.’79 Samuel Barkin argues that the term ‘qualitative’ evokes a narrative or analytical 
richness, a methods that lends itself for bringing out more detail and nuance. But in 
practice, the term is mostly used to simply mean ‘not quantitative.’80 I will use it in a 
positive sense when analyzing the National Security Strategies and speeches by Bush 
and Obama. The next chapter combines qualitative and quantitative research in 
considering how military privatization manifested itself under the Obama administrations. 
The combination of the two helps me to answer the question whether the policy 
implementation regarding military privatization during the Obama presidency can be seen 
as a continuation of the Bush’s administration’s policy in this area.  
  
 
76 Denzin and Lincoln, Handbook of qualitative research, 7. 
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2. US Military privatization in Iraq 
Mercenaries are as old as war itself, often being referred to as the second-oldest 
profession. Nearly every past empire has contracted foreign troops in some form or 
another.81 Nonstate violence is thus by no means a novel development. It has dominated 
the international system in the past. Singer argues that in a broad view of history the 
state itself is a rather new unit of governance, which has only appeared in the last four 
hundred years.82 After the Thirty Years’ war states began to consolidate their monopoly 
of force, with the Peace of Westphalia (1648).83 If the Westphalian notion of sovereignty 
stipulated that states put (their) private armies out of business, Napoleonic reforms 
helped consolidating the state monopoly of force.84 Napoleon’s armies consisted mostly 
of French citizens assembled under levée en masse, the famous act of conscription, 
which called upon all of French society to contribute to the war efforts in August of 
1793.85 The revolutions during the 18th and 19th century also established a bond between 
the individual and the state, which in turn gave rise to nationalism and created a link 
between military service and patriotic duty.86 Sean McFate makes two points with regard 
to this. Firstly, in order for states to govern as the only authority within their territory, 
they needed a monopoly on force in order to uphold their rule of law. Threats to this 
monopoly were prohibited, such as the use of mercenaries. Secondly, the Westphalian 
system established that states were responsible for trans-border violence, even if the 
state itself did not support that violence. This led to states prohibiting armies out of fear 
that they might start a conflict, which could drag states into war with one and other.87  
McFate, falling back on Max Weber, defines the state as ‘a human community that 
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory.’88 However, private armies were resurrected shortly after the end of the Cold 
War.89 Singer argues that ‘almost overnight’ an entire global order collapsed.90 The end 
of the superpower rivalry resulted in military downsizing.91 The military downsizing by 
the US led to studies in the early 1990’s regarding the military capabilities needed to 
fulfill future military requirement. The fear was that the force structure would be 
insufficient in size. DoD and U.S army policymakers concluded that one way to meet 
future military needs was to hire personnel from the private sector. The military 
downsizing provided both ‘push and pull’ factors for the private military industry. ‘On the 
one hand, demobilized military personnel and decommissioned equipment provided a 
ready supply of capacity, while on the other, demand increased as rich countries became 
more reluctant to intervene in unstable parts of the globe and abandoned previous Cold 
War allies or clients to their own devices.’92 
According to Singer, there were two other factors necessary for the emergence of 
the private security industry. The first factor consists of the broad transformations that 
developed in the nature of warfare itself. These transformations have created new 
market opportunities and new demands for Private Military Security Companies (PMSC’s). 
The second factor is the so-called ‘privatization revolution.’93 This ‘privatization 
revolution’ is part of the process of neoliberalism, which is instrumental for Pieterse’s 
thesis of neoliberal empire; a process generally traced back to the policies of Ronald 
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher.  
 
81 Peter W. Singer, Corporate warriors. The rise of the privatized military industry (Ithaca 2007) 19. 
82 Singer, Corporate warriors, 19.  
83 Sean McFate, ‘The evolution of private force’, in: Joakim Berndtsson and Christopher Kinsey (eds.), The 
Routledge research companion to security outsourcing (New York 2016) pp. 65-75, there 69. 
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2003) 184. 
86 McFate, ‘The evolution of private force’, 70. 
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Neoliberalism is often described as a package deal, containing deregulation 
(liberalization, privatization), financialization and securitization (the conversion of assets 
into tradeable financial instruments), marketization (unleashing market forces), 
combined with the ideology of lean government.94 Singer argues that the ‘privatization 
revolution’ provided the logic, legitimacy and models for markets to enter into formerly 
state domains.95 In this context, Abrahamsen and Leander argue that the definition of 
state, in the traditional Weberian sense, as the ‘monopoly of legitimate use of force’ has 
become increasingly out of sync with reality. They make the argument that private 
security has now become an intrinsic aspect of modern life.96 
 
Iraq as a most likely case of military privatization 
According to Stanley Bruce operation Iraqi freedom, ranging from March 2003 to 
December 2011, can be seen as a most likely case, similar to Eckstein’s notion of crucial 
case study,97 due to the criterion of contractor presence.98 Bruce states that the size and 
the budget of US military operations during operation Iraqi Freedom were significantly 
lower than during the peak cold war levels. The intervention lasted over eight years, in 
which the U.S faced competing conflicts around the world. Due to all these reasons, it 
was likely that the US would have to rely on the private security industry for significant 
support.99 The fact that operation Iraqi freedom can be considered a most likely case, 
makes it ideal for my research regarding the use of private military companies by the US 
in Iraq. I will however not limit myself to the period of operation Iraqi Freedom, but look 
at the entirety of the Obama administrations’ presence in Iraq.  
The privatization and outsourcing of war falls under the conceptual umbrella of 
surrogate warfare. Andreas Krieg and Jean-Marc Rickli define surrogate warfare as the 
externalization of the burden of warfare in all the forms this may take to substitutionary 
or supplementary forces and platforms. 100 Krieg argues that amid the globalization and 
transnationalization of conflict the state has discovered that surrogate warfare can be 
used to ‘externalize, partially or wholly, the strategic, operational and tactical burden of 
warfare to human or technological surrogate with the principal intent of minimizing the 
burden of warfare for its own taxpayers, soldiers and policymakers.’101 In the context of 
surrogate warfare it is telling that US military contracting dramatically increased after 
9/11. The US needed manpower to fight its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and was already 
suffering from a man-power shortage. Especially for the conflict in Iraq a large number of 
contractors was needed.102 This led to a significant increase in the use of PMSC’s, which 
resulted in a use of contractors that was unprecedented in both its size and scope.103 A 
new type of contractor emerged, one that carried guns and undertook contracts that 
allowed the use of deadly force.  
The development blurred the definition of what used to be a ‘inherently 
governmental’  function.104 Martha Lizabeth Phelps argues that the US’ dramatic increase 
in military contracting is most clearly demonstrated in comparison to domestic troop 
counts. By 2004, private contractors came to exceed British national troops and by 2006, 
the period in which the heaviest fighting took place, the number of private contractors 
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exceeded that of US national troops.105 Adam Moore argues that the growth of military 
contracting in recent years is a significant development that shows a fundamental change 
in how the US conducts its wars. New is not reliance on private companies and labor to 
support US military campaigns, which has a long history, but rather the scale and scope 
of this phenomenon.106 During World War II the ratio of contractors to US military 
personnel was around 1:7 and in Vietnam this ratio was at 1:6. During the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan the total numbers of contractors became roughly equal to the number of 
US military personnel.107 Moore states that the US has now become dependent on 
contracted labor, most notably in the realm of logistics in order to fight its wars.108 
 
Private Military Security Companies: different types of contractors  
Much of the attention has been focused on contractors that carry firearms. However, the 
vast majority of contracts concerns supply and support services.109 This is why 
Berndtsson and Kinsey argue that a distinction must be made between armed security 
contractors and military contractors. Military services are often portrayed the same. 
However logistics and security services are something different. Berndtsson and Kinsey 
argue that contractors have always supported military operations, whereas the provision 
of private security is something fairly new. They add to this by arguing that outsourcing 
support services and logistics is less controversial politically as opposed to outsourcing 
armed protection.110 
The Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC), which was established by 
Congress in 2008, divided the services provided to the US government into three main 
categories: logistics, security and reconstruction. 111 Logistic services consists of supply 
of food, fuel, laundry services and base facility construction. During the early years of the 
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US Army’s logistics civil augmentation contract 
(also known as LOGCAP) was awarded to Kellogg, Brown and Boot (KBR). In June of 
2007 a new LOGCAP contract (LOGCAP IV) was given to three companies: DynCorp 
International, Fluor Intercontinental and KBR.112 In Iraq alone, the LOGCAP contract 
between 2003 and 2007 awarded obligations totaling 22 billion dollar.113 
Security services consist of guarding people, convoys and buildings. These are the 
tasks that are most similar to those performed by US soldiers. Security contractors are 
often times armed. They frequently shoot, or are shoot at, in carrying out their duties. 
The Congressional Budget Office estimated that somewhere between 30.000 to 35.000 
contractors working in Iraq were armed. 114 The company formerly known under 
Blackwater (the name changed into Xe and is currently known as Academi)115 received 
notoriety whilst providing security in Iraq supporting both the US military and State 
Department. Blackwater personnel operating in Iraq fell under the State Department’s 
Worldwide Personal Protective Services (WPPS) contract, which allowed them to carry 
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weapons, have their own helicopters and fight off insurgents in ways that are hard to 
distinguish from military actions.116 
Reconstruction services consist of building, from physical infrastructure to 
institutions. Examples of physical infrastructure are roads, water, communication and 
power. Examples of institutions range from providing training for military, police, justice 
personnel and other employees of government to the supporting of civil society group 
and promoting the rule of law and democratization. These services are provided by a 
wide range of PMC’s. DynCorp was important in this sphere, training police, constructing 
police and prison facilities and building capacity for justice systems.117 
 
The use of PMSC’s by the Bush administration 
There exist few data about the number of contractors in the early years of the conflict. 
The reason is that the US government did not collect this information.118 This is why 
McFate argues that the primary obstacle on research regarding the private military 
industry is the lack of data available. Private military firms can be more obscure than US 
military or intelligence agencies. This derives from the fact that they are not subject to 
the Freedom of Information Act or other similar legislative tools for imposing 
transparency.119 Micah Zenko, in studying the role that contractors played in military 
operations, noticed there is no easy way to assess this role given the absence of data.120 
The US government offers no practical overview, especially for the decade after 9/11. US 
Central Command (CENTCOM) only started to release data on contractors from the 
second half of 2007 onward. 121 
Data that are available in the first years of the conflict concern the amount of 
money allocated by the US government to contractors operating in Iraq. In 2008 the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), a federal agency that provides budget and economic 
information to Congress, came out with a report titled ‘Contractors’ support of US 
operations in Iraq.’122 This paper covers the period from 2003 to 2007 and provides an 
overview of contracting in Iraq.123 In this period the US spent more than 85 billion dollars 
on contracts.124 However the CBO states that this number doesn’t account for the entire 
US spending as it pertains to Iraq, because it doesn’t include the costs of contracts 
supporting operations in Iraq, but are performed in countries outside Iraq.125 One 
example of this is the military equipment manufactured for use in Iraq. The CBO also 
comes with an estimate, on the basis of data collected from the DOS, USAID and DOD, 
regarding the number of contractor personnel that work in Iraq. It estimates that 190.00 
contractor personnel work on contracts funded by the US government, making the ratio 
of US military members in Iraq to US funded contractor employees approximately 1:1.126 
The CBO estimates that around 20 percent of these contractors was US citizen. Local 
nationals, defined by the CBO as citizens of the country in which they are working, make 
up another 40 percent of the contractor personnel. The last 40 percent consists of third-
country nationals, who are neither local nationals nor US citizens.127 This makes the 
private security workforce in Iraq truly a transnational phenomenon.  
 
116 Avant, ‘The mobilization of forces after 9/11’, 211.  
117 Ibidem, 211.  
118 Deborah Avant, ‘The mobilization of private forces after 9/11. Ad hoc response to inadequate planning’, in: 
James Burk (eds.), How 9/11 changed our ways of war ( Stanford 2013) pp. 209-231, there 209.  
119 Sean McFate, The modern mercenary. Private armies and what they mean for world order (Oxford 2014) 29.  
120 Micah Zenko, Mercenaries are the silent majority of Obama’s military’ (version May 18, 2016), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/18/private-contractors-are-the-silent-majority-of-obamas-military-
mercenaries-iraq-afghanistan/ (June 4, 2020).  
121 Moshe Schwartz and Joyprada Swain, ‘Department of defense contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: 
background and analysis’, Congressional research service (2011) pp. 1-32, there 4.  
122 Congressional Budget Office, ‘Contractor support of US operations in Iraq’ (version August 2008), 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/110th-congress-2007-2008/reports/08-12-iraqcontractors.pdf (1 June 
2020) pp.1-28. 
123 CBO, ‘Contractor support of US operations in Iraq’. 
124 Ibidem, 2. 
125 Ibidem, 2. 
126 Ibidem, 8. 
127 Ibidem, 8.  
16 
 
The amount of contractors that have died during the Bush presidency in Iraq is 
not easily available. Bern Debusmann estimates that as of July 2007, the contractor 
death toll passed one thousand, and another 13.000 wounded. These data are limited 
however, in that they only account for insurance claims made by contractors’ employers 
and reported to the US Department of Labor.128 The deaths of contractor are not officially 
counted in the Pentagon’s death tolls.129 These contractor death statistics mean that the 
private military industry has suffered more losses in Iraq than the totality of the rest of 
the allied forces combined.130 When US soldiers die in service of their country abroad, the 
Pentagon issues a detailed news release and the service member’s death appears on the 
‘casualty status’ website, which is constantly updated. 131 However this is not the case for 
contractors. Their employers are, in theory, required to report their death, after which 
family members can file a claim for insurance compensation, after which a case is 
created. To complicate matters even further, sometimes contracting activities are 
subcontracted to host nationals, that can fail to report deaths to the original contractor 
due to improper documentation or a lack of literacy. Zenko derives from this that 
contractor fatalities are almost certainly undercounted.132 Singer argues that contractor 
deaths are regarded by policy makers as almost a ‘positive externality’, in that the public 
doesn’t usually hear about contractor losses. And even when they do, this has far less 
blowback on the US government.133 
 
Why PMSC’s were employed by the Bush administration  
As mentioned earlier, the US, was already short on man-power and needed personnel for 
the conflict in Iraq. Deborah Avant argues that increasing privatization was not an 
intentional policy but rather an ‘ad hoc response’ to poor planning for troop 
requirements.’134 She argues that the increase in use of PMSC’s after 9/11 was not 
according to a plan but according to a need.135 She states: ‘Although politicians cast 
terrorism as an existential threat, and although military analysts suggested that a 
constabulary force would be best suited to meeting such a threat, the Bush 
administration did not believe it could or should sell mobilization of such a force to the 
American public, even immediately after 9/11. Privatization was not a response to 9/11; 
it was a tool to fill the mobilization gap created by poor judgment about force 
requirements after 9/11.’136 Avant’s reasoning makes it seem like the Bush 
administration had little choice but to rely on private military companies.  
Singer argues that it is not that the US had no other choices, yet that the other 
choices were considered politically undesirable. 137 Other solutions could have been to 
send more regular forces. However this would have involved publicly that those involved 
in planning, specifically Secretary Rumsfeld, were wrong. Another option would have 
been a call-upp of the Reserves and the National Guard. This would have resulted in 
massive outcry among the public. A third option could have been to persuade other allies 
to send more troops in. However, to do so would have involved tough compromises, such 
as granting NATO or U.N. command of the forces.138 
The private military industry provided an answer to these problem, an answer that 
had not existed for policymakers in the recent past. It could serve as a potential backstop 
of additional forces, without having to lose political capital. There was no outcry when 
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contractors were called upon and deployed, or, as shown earlier, lost.139 Singer argues 
that private military industry by now has become the ultimate enabler. It allows 
operations to happen that might otherwise be politically impossible.140 Berndtsson and 
Kinsey add that PMSC’s can be understood in certain situations as strategic tools of 
government and as a means to exercise power and promote national interests, while 
simultaneously steering clear of some of the pitfalls in international politics. They argue 
that the use of PMSC’s is not only operational or tactical, but also part of a larger picture 
of power, politics and interests at the national and international levels.141 The US’ 
increased reliance on PMSC’s thus affects the US’ foreign policy. For a long time foreign 
policy was the domain of the state and involved state-to-state interactions undertaken by 
diplomats. Renee de Nevers argues that this is no longer the case. Three changes 
complicate our understanding of foreign policy today.142  
The first change that Nevers identifies is an increasingly globalized world, which 
brings with it the challenge of defining national interests, when states confront 
challenges, ranging from terrorism to climate change, that require multilateral 
solutions.143 The second is the erosion of the state’s role in pursuing its foreign policy. 
New government agencies and non-state actors have become players in the field of 
government-to-government interaction, which had formerly been the diplomatic realm.144 
The third challenge particularly applies to the US and concerns the blurring of lines 
between foreign policy and national security policy. The response to the terrorist attacks 
of 9/11 led to a climate of insecurity and pervasive threat. This was heightened by the 
expanded role of the DOD. Functions formerly undertaken by the State Department 
where now allocated to the DOD. This has put a military face on US foreign policy to a 
degree that differentiates it from other liberal democratic states.145 
The militarization of US foreign policy has led to PMSC’s becoming important 
international actors that affect foreign policy. De Nevers states: ‘PMSC’s shape foreign 
and security decisions through private involvement in intelligence, policy analysis, and 
training of government officials and troops. Increasingly PMSC’s help shape the way the 
states see the world, through their risk and security analysis and consulting services.’146 
Some private security activities in support of foreign policy include protection, logistics 
and reconstruction functions. De Nevers shows that PMSC’s increasingly conduct security 
sector reform activities and provide military training, previously a major part of US 
foreign aid. They can also act as foreign policy proxies enabling them to extend foreign 
influence for the governments that employ them. 147 PMSC’s have become virtually 
indispensable for the US’ foreign and security policy. The US is now no longer able to 
engage in in many foreign policy areas without reliance on private actors.148 
PMSC’s can have direct and indirect effects on foreign policy. A specialized PMSC 
can be hired to perform a specific task, which may lead to a effectively implemented 
policy, potentially at a reasonable cost. This can facilitate a state’s foreign policy goals. 
However, a PMSC can also take on task that enable it to shape perceptions of foreign 
policy and national interest. This has raised questions about whether corporate and 
national interests coincide with one another.149 A PMSC can have an impact on foreign 
policy is if its actions elsewhere color the perceptions of the home state, either negatively 
or positively.150 
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Private military companies give states an increased capacity and flexibility, the 
two most commonly noted benefits regarding military outsourcing.151 The increased 
capacity is not only relevant as it pertains to providing manpower when needed, but it 
also allows to draw upon specialized skill sets that may not be maintained in the 
military.152 The increased flexibility shows itself in providing government bureaucracy 
with organizational improvisation, which is not seen in the public sector. PMSC’s often 
have a workforce ready that are able to begin work within matter of days or weeks after 
signing a contract. Another part of the advantage of increased flexibility is political in 
nature. It allows governments to operate with fewer ‘military boots’ on the ground and 
maintain military capacity without an increase in military manpower.153 
 
Obama’s reliance on PMSC’s  
Now that I have looked at the manifestation of PMSC’s in Iraq under the Bush 
administration and why it was attractive for the Bush administration to deploy private 
military contractors on a therefore unprecedented scale, it is time to examine if this 
reliance on military contractors continued under the Obama presidency. For this analysis 
I will make use of reports from government agencies, such as the Congressional 
Research Service, CENTCOM and the Commission on Wartime Contracting, because from 
the second half of 2007 onward, more data and reports became available regarding the 
use of contractors. 
Between 2007 and 2009 the security situation in Iraq continued to improve, which 
led the newly elected president Barack Obama to call for a withdrawal of all US troops by 
December 2011. This announcement was in line with the earlier agreed on 2009 US- 
Iraqi security agreement, which mentioned the complete withdrawal of all US forces.154 
In his speech, given at camp Lejeune, Obama stated that the US wanted to ‘pursue a 
new strategy to end the war in Iraq through a transition to full Iraqi responsibility.’155 
This strategy consisted of three parts: a responsible removal of US combat brigades and 
the complete removal of forces from Iraq by the end of 2011, a ‘sustained diplomacy on 
behalf of a more peaceful and prosperous Iraq’, and finally, a comprehensive 
engagement across the region and the establishment of a new framework that advances 
both Iraq’s and the region’s security.156 
Obama wanted to adopt a more multilateral security strategy. He argued: ‘we can 
no longer deal with regional challenges in isolation – we need a smarter, more 
sustainable and comprehensive approach. That is why we are renewing our diplomacy, 
while relieving the burden on our military.’157 As it pertains to the private military 
industry, Obama stated that he wanted to change one of the Bush administration’s 
priorities, namely the huge number of contracts awarded to the private industry. With 
regard to this, Obama said: ‘there is a fundamental public trust that we must uphold. The 
American people's money must be spent to advance their priorities, not to line the 
pockets of contractors or to maintain projects that don't work.’158 Obama also stated: ‘we 
cannot win a fight for hearts and minds when we outsource critical missions to 
unaccountable contractors.’159 These are all statements made by Obama at the beginning 
of his presidency. Yet do the data support the statements made by Obama in this regard?  
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As mentioned earlier, from the second half of 2007 onward, the US government 
started to collect and provide more data regarding the use of contractors by the 
Department of State (DOD). However, these data provided by the DOD do not depict the 
whole picture as it pertains to the US government employing private contractors. Both 
the Department of State and USAID (United States Agency for International 
Development) have employed private contractors. In Moshe Schwartz’s report to 
congress in 2011 he concluded that: ‘as the military continues to withdraw from Iraq, the 
Department of State will assume greater responsibility for providing security and will 
have to hire more PSC personnel.’160 In a similar report to Congress, Heidi Peters 
concluded: ‘according to government officials, both DOD and the Department of State 
would be unable to execute their missions in Afghanistan and Iraq without the support of 
PSCs.’161 This goes to show the important role PMSC’s fulfill not only for the DOD, but 
also for the Department of State.  
However, information regarding the employment of PMSC’s by the Department of 
State and USAID is rarely made available and without much specifics. The difference in 
the availability of data between the DOD and the Department of State and USAID, 
derives from the fact that, in 2008, Congress instructed the DOD to start collecting data 
on private military contractors.162 The Department of Defense and USAID do not fall 
under these regulations. With the data provided by the DOD, in quarterly reports (from 
2010 onward) and reports, I have compiled two tables to help categorize and make 
sense of the data. They are presented below. 
  
Table 1: Department of Defense contractor levels (DOD), based on quarterly CENTCOM 
census reports from 2010 onward.163 
 
FOURTH 
QUARTER 
OF EACH 
YEAR  
TOTAL 
CONTRACTORS 
DOD 
US 
CITIZENS  
THIRD 
COUNTRY 
NATIONALS  
LOCAL/HOST 
COUNTRY 
NATIONALS 
PSC (PRIVATE 
SECURITY 
CONTRACTOR) 
PERSONNEL 
2010 74.106  20.981 42.457 10.668 11.682 
2011 52.637 16.054 29.213 7.370 9554 
2012 9000 2314 4621 2065 2116 
2013 6624 1626 2807 2191 2409 
2014 - - - - - 
2015 1403 1098 41 264 - 
2016 2992 1823 737 432 - 
2017 3592 2035 1067 490 - 
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Table 2: Department of Defense contractor and troop levels in Iraq 2009-2017, based on 
‘Department of Defense contractor and troop levels in Afghanistan and Iraq: 2007-2018’ 
a report by the Congressional Research Service.164 
 
FOURTH 
QUARTER 
OF EACH 
YEAR, 
EXCEPT 
2017 
(FIRST 
QUARTER)  
US 
ARMED 
FORCES  
TOTAL 
CONTRAC
TORS DOD 
US NATIONAL 
CONTRACTORS  
FOREIGN AND 
HOST COUNTRY 
NATIONAL 
CONTRACTORS  
RATIO US 
ARMED 
FORCES TO 
CONTRACTOR 
PERSONNEL  
2009 129.200 113.731 29.944 83.787 1: 0.88 
2010 48.410 74.106 20.981 53.125 1: 1.53 
2011 44.755 52.637 16.054 36.583 1: 1.18 
2012 - 9000 2314 6686 0: 9000 
2013 - 6624 1626  0: 6624 
2014 - - - - - 
2015 3550 1403 1098 305 1: 0.40  
2016 4087 2992 1392 1169 1: 0.73 
2017 5262 3592 2035 1557 1: 0.68 
 
 
As the tables show, from 2009 to 2011 we can see the number of total DOD contractors 
steadily drop, from 148.050 in the first quarter of 2009 to 52.637 in the last quarter of 
2011. This decrease in contractors is in line with Obama’s promise to remove troops from 
Iraq. However, what is not in line with this promise is that at the beginning of 2012 there 
was still a significant contractor presence, namely 23.886. So even though there were no 
more US armed forces at the beginning of 2012, private contractors were now filling this 
void. The ratio of US armed forces to DOD Contractor personnel was consistently more 
than 1:1; in 2010 more than 1.5 times as much contractors as US troops. Another 
development that Schwartz and Swain notice in their report to congress, is that the 
number of contractors did not decrease uniformly across the contractor workforce. Since 
July 2008, base support and construction declined, whereas the contractors providing 
security actually increased by 14%.165 On the basis of the period from 2009-2011 we can 
conclude that even though the number of contractors decreased significantly, the number 
of contractors relative to US armed forces actually increased and the number of private 
contractors providing security also increased. 
The period from 2011-2014 saw contractors from the DOD decreasing with each 
year. However there was still a significant contractor presence as opposed to US armed 
forces, who had left. The reason may be that Obama tried to renegotiate the stay of US 
armed forces for a post-2011 troop presence. However, these negotiations failed.166 The 
contractors were used to fill the vacuum left behind by the US armed forces and to help 
ease the transition. In 2014, CENTCOM didn’t release information on contractors in Iraq, 
indicating there were little DOD contractors. However, if one examines the first quarter of 
2015, one can see that there were 250 DOD contractors in Iraq. Yet the report also 
states that around 5000 contractors are supporting US government operations. The 
contractor presence is thus much larger than the DOD data indicates.167 
From 2015 to 2017 we see DOD contractors returning to Iraq due to the rise of 
the Islamic State. As a result of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, there would likely 
be little support for major US involvement and US boots on the ground. Metin Gurcan has 
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argued that this provided opportunities for PMSC’s, that could help conceal just how 
many people were actually fighting in this conflict.’168 This shows in the number of DOD 
contractors returning to Iraq, from 250 DOD contractors at the beginning of 2015, to 
5262 contractors at the beginning of 2017. All these findings lead me to conclude that 
Obama’s reliance on PMSC’s did not decrease in comparison with the Bush presidency. 
The total number of contractors did decrease as a result of the withdrawal of troops from 
Iraq. However, the ratio of contractors to US armed forces actually increased. 
Contractors were used to extend the US stay in Iraq and the percentage of private 
contractors providing security increased. Once IS gained ground in Iraq, contractors were 
sent back to Iraq. As Zenko has stated: ‘the president’s ‘light footprint’ approach to war 
has relied on thousands of Americans paid to fight—and die—in the shadows.’169 The only 
thing I would like to add to this is that most weren’t American. 
 
The consequences of relying on PMSC’s for a neoliberal empire 
The (re)emergence of the private military sector has changed the options available to the 
US for the conduct of foreign policy.170 The use of private security has further enhanced 
the US’ ability to project military force.171 The US can now wield power and exploit 
situations to its own advantage without at the same time exposing itself to accusations of 
neo-colonialism, or the use of power maximizing strategies that could lead to open 
conflict.172 As Singer has argued, the private military industry has become the ultimate 
enabler, allowing operations to happen that would otherwise be politically impossible.173 
These aren’t the only consequences that come with this new form of power. The 
use of private contractors, especially armed, poses significant risks to US government 
interests. In his report to Congress Schwartz has concluded that the use of armed private 
security contractors can undermine efforts to win hearts and minds during 
counterinsurgency and other contingency operations.174 Military commanders can directly 
control the actions of military personnel and government civilians. However, their control 
over individual contractor personnel is less direct. In a Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) report from August 2008 it says: ‘The military commander generally lacks the 
authority either to increase the scope (dollar value) of the contract or to change the 
contractor’s duties except in ways anticipated in the contract language.’175 The military 
commander thus has less direct authority over the actions of contractor employees. 
The private mission is often different from the overall public operation. Singer 
gives as example contractors on escort duty. They are going to be judged by their bosses 
on whether they achieve their mission of bringing their client from point A to B, and not 
on whether they ‘win Iraqi hearts and minds along the way.’176 Exeline Starr (a former 
Coalition Provisional Authority adviser) addresses the difference, in her experience, in 
travelling with a military escort and travelling with guards from Blackwater and DynCorp. 
While the soldiers kept her save, they also did things as drinking tea and playing cards 
with local Iraqis. In contrast, the contractors told her: ‘Our mission is to protect the 
principal at all cost, if that means pissing of the Iraqis, too bad.’177 Due to their profit-
driven nature, private military companies prioritized the provision of security to their 
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clients, above the security concerns of other actors that inhabited their operating 
environment.178  
Related to this, the Commission on Wartime Contracting concluded that ‘military 
outsourcing can hurt US goals and objectives is by injuring innocent members of the local 
population or outraging their sensibilities. The can endanger the safety of military 
personnel or federal civilians, if the ‘contractors’ presence or performance creates unsafe 
conditions or invites attack.’179 A prime example of this is the killing of seventeen Iraqi 
civilians by Blackwater personnel in Baghdad’s Nisour square in 2007.180 Meanwhile, the 
local population often does not distinguish between contractors and the US army. The 
local population then tends to blame the army for any unwelcome behavior perpetrated 
by contractors.181 Another consequence of the US’ use of private military companies is 
that it has led to waste and fraud. The Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) 
concludes that the use of private contractors has led to significant waste, around one of 
four dollars spent.182 The CWC estimates that waste and fraud range from 31 billion 
dollar to 60 billion dollar.183 
A whole other discussion to be had is the legal issues that come with the use of 
PMSC’s and the legal framework surrounding them. PMSC personnel operating in Iraq 
was granted immunity from Iraqi law from 2004 to 2009, which means that its legal 
accountability was unclear. Only from January of 2009 onward did PMSC’s become 
accountable under Iraqi law.184 Another implication of the increased reliance on PMSC’s is 
a reduction in transparency, especially as it pertains to decision making. Reliance on 
contractors can lead to policy decisions being removed from the public view as a result of 
confidentiality clauses regarding contracts.185 Reliance on PMSC’s can also erode 
accountability in the foreign policy sphere. As Nevers notes: ‘Contracting enables 
governments to undertake tasks without public debate, because they need not explain to 
legislatures how contractors will be used in the way that they would if soldiers or 
diplomats were tasked to operate overseas. Governments can also deny responsibility for 
actions undertaken by private security actors, particularly if they go badly, although this 
is risky.’ 186  
Last but not least, the use of contractors obscures the full human cost of war. The 
CWC states that ‘the full cost includes all casualties, and to neglect contractor deaths 
hides the political risks of conducting overseas contingency operations. In particular, 
significant contractor deaths and injuries have largely remained uncounted and 
unpublicized by the US government and the media.’187  
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3. US foreign policy marketing: neoliberal? 
How was the US presence in Iraq marketed to the public under both the Bush and Obama 
presidency? Pieterse makes the argument that ‘Neoliberal business is characterized by an 
inverse relationship between marketing and product, with more effort and quality going 
into marketing than the product. Customers are supposed to buy the marketing rather 
than the product.’188 Marketing is an instrumental attribute to Pieterse’s definition of 
neoliberal empire. Moreover, according to Pieterse, neoliberal marketing principles carry 
over into government operations.189 Now, the Iraq war was carefully marketed as a ‘blow 
for freedom’ by the Bush administration. 190 Obama, however, had been opposed to the 
Iraq war from the beginning, labelling it a ‘dumb’ and ‘rash’ war.191 The foreign policy 
marketing of US presence in Iraq could be fundamentally different, then, under the 
Obama presidency than under the Bush presidency. My focus will therefore lie on the 
differences and continuities between how the US presence in Iraq was marketed by both 
the Bush and Obama administration. I will also look at how U.S presence in Iraq fits into 
both administrations’ grand strategies. I will first address the concept of marketing in the 
foreign policy sphere. After that, I will look at the Bush administration’s foreign policy 
marketing efforts regarding Iraq and the place it took in his grand strategy. Finally, I will 
use the same analysis for the Obama presidency, which helps me pinpoint continuities 
and changes between both presidency’s. 
In order to trace the change and continuity in foreign policy produced during the 
Bush presidency and Obama presidency, I use National Security Strategies from both the 
Bush and Obama administrations. A National Security Strategy (NSS) is a document that 
is issued by the executive branch of the government for the US congress. The goal of a 
NSS is to be a comprehensive statement that articulates the US worldwide interests, 
objectives and goals regarding its security. One of the reporting requirements of a NSS is 
to detail the actions needed to deter aggression and the actions required for the 
implementation of the NSS.192 It is an overarching statement describing how an 
administration sees all the pieces of foreign policy fitting together.193 The Goldwater-
Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986 dictates that the president must 
submit a NSS annually. However in recent years these reports have often not been 
made.194 Both the Bush and Obama administration have produced two National Security 
Strategies each. Bush produced one in 2002 and in 2006; Obama in 2010 and in 2015. 
Another important part of my analysis are speeches given by Bush and Obama that deal 
with US military presence in Iraq.          
    
US foreign policy marketing  
Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen argue that in order ‘to garner public support for their 
foreign and security policies, state leaders need to market their policies to the public, the 
opposition, and their constituencies, allies, and adversaries.’195 It is crucial for state 
leaders to market their policies to different constituencies, just as marketers promote 
their products to generate sales. Leaders can market war, peace and other foreign policy 
decisions.196 Mintz and DeRouen divide the discipline of marketing into three 
subcategories. First and foremost there is the marketing of products and services to 
consumers and the consumer relationship management (CRM). Then you have political 
marketing, which focusses on the marketing of political candidates, political platforms 
and political parties. And lastly, you have international relations marketing, dealing with 
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the marketing of foreign policy and national security policies, including war and peace.197 
My research regarding the marketing efforts by the Bush and Obama administration falls 
under the last subcategory. 
One marketing strategy that is often used is framing. People’s ideas and choices 
are affected not only by how a situation is described but also how it is framed.198 Leaders 
attempt to impose or introduce and promote frames, which affect how the public 
perceives a particular situation.199 Mintz and DeRouen illustrate this by using Bush’s 
framing of the sides in the global war on terror. Bush declared: ‘either you are with us, or 
you are with the terrorists.’ He referred to conflict as one ‘between good and evil’ and ‘us 
versus them’, while also declaring: ‘if anybody harbors a terrorist, they’re a terrorist. If 
they fund a terrorist, they’re terrorists. If they house terrorists, they’re terrorists.’200 One 
important role of the president of the US as a foreign policy marketeer is setting an 
agenda and reference point for the public. The Bush administration did this by framing a 
new setting with the Global War on Terror (GWOT), which became the new national 
security narrative. Jeffrey Kubiak argues that this narrative constructed a world in which 
there were basically two kinds of actors: people who where civilized and loved freedom, 
and those who hated freedom. Against these ‘forces of evil’ the US would take the 
offense in pursuit of ‘freedom.’201 Kubiak argues that Bush’s freedom agenda adopts the 
notion of the universality of US values, while also asserting that prosperity and power of 
the US are a direct offshoot of these values. If people were liberated from ‘the evil of 
tyranny’ they could enjoy the same freedom and prosperity as the US Bush famously 
stated in relation to this: ‘the advance of freedom is the surest strategy to undermine the 
appeal of terror in our world. Where freedom takes hold, hatred gives way to hope.’202  
Marketing and framing are feasible strategies to use in the foreign policy sphere, 
and then especially in crisis situations or ambiguous relations, because the public 
typically has limited knowledge and information regarding the crisis.203 Leaders want to 
make decisions that are supported more than they are opposed.204 With respect to this, 
Louis Klarevas argues that public opinion plays an important factor in the calculation of 
where, when, why and how to employ US armed forces abroad.205 This is illustrated by 
the National Security Strategy for a New Century, from 1997, which stated: The United 
States cannot long sustain a fight without the support of the public.’206 Public opinion 
must be weighed when contemplating the use of force.  
  
Bush’s Iraq narrative  
Pieterse makes the argument that a regime change in Iraq came on the Bush 
administration’s agenda soon after 9/11, 2001.207 The marketing campaign however, only 
started seriously in September of 2002. Andrew Card jr., former White House chief of 
staff, explained why the rhetorical campaign on Iraq seemed to start quite suddenly in 
September of 2002: ‘From a marketing point of view, you don’t introduce new products 
in August.208 According to several White House officials, Bush’s speech, on 9 September 
of 2002, one year after the 9/11 attacks, was meant to function as a centerpiece of a 
meticulously planned strategy in order to persuade the public of the need to take action 
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against Iraq and the need to confront the threat from Saddam Hussein.209 The speech on 
September 11, 2002, did not mention Iraq specifically. However the Global War on terror 
did play an important part. Bush used the speech to remind Americans of the greatness 
of its citizens and remind them of the dangerous enemy they fight: ‘There is a line in our 
time and e time between the defenders of human liberty and those who seek to master 
the minds and souls of others. Our generation has now heard history’s call, and we will 
answer it.’210 The speech of September 11 was also intended to serve as a emotional 
precursor for a tougher speech on Iraq that he would give to the United Nations the 
following day.211 
In the UN speech, Bush first speaks of the broader threat of terrorism, and the 
fact that this threat hides within many nations in the form of cells and camps. He then 
goes on to address his greatest fear, which is an outlaw regime providing terrorists ‘with 
the technologies to kill on a massive scale.’ He refers to Iraq as just such an outlaw 
regime: ‘In one place— in one regime— we find all these dangers, in their most lethal 
and aggressive forms.’212 He specifies the threat the regime of Saddam Hussein posed 
and the weapons of mass destruction that Iraq has supposedly been working towards. He 
concludes that ‘the history, the logic, and the facts lead to one conclusion: Saddam 
Hussein’s regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope 
against the evidence. To assume this regime's good faith is to bet the lives of millions 
and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble. And this is a risk we must not take.’213 
In his address to the U.N. Bush also speaks on the plight of Iraqi citizens. ‘If we fail to 
act in the face of danger, the people of Iraq will continue to live in brutal submission.’ He 
concludes with tying the liberty of the Iraqi people to the security of all nations. ’Liberty 
for the Iraqi people is a great moral cause, and a great strategic goal. The people of Iraq 
deserve it; the security of all nations requires it.’214 Just a mere five days later the Bush 
administration would roll out its Nation Security Strategy, on September 17th.   
             
2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) and US Grand Strategy  
‘The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended 
with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom—and a single sustainable model for 
national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.’215 This quote from Bush 
opens the National Security Strategy of September, 2002. A NSS usually consists of 
around 50 pages and projects the perceived position of US power and influence in the 
world at that moment in time. It also presents a general description of the most 
important threats to US national security, as well as providing the administration’s 
policies and strategies to deal with these threats.216 This makes it an important document 
in helping do determine the grand strategy of the US. Hemmer argues that is even so 
important that you can use grand strategy and national security strategy interchangeably 
in the case of the US.217 Grand strategy is basically a ‘state’s theory how it can ‘cause’ 
security for itself.’218 I will examine the national security strategies of Both Bush and 
Obama to help determine the role Iraq played in both administrations and the importance 
ascribed to Iraq as part of their foreign policy marketing.    
The main trait that made the Bush NSS such a ‘new and sweeping’ security 
doctrine was the fact that the US asserted the right to use force again ‘terrorists with a 
global reach’ anywhere in the world. John Ikenberry sees it as the most systematic 
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statement of Bush strategic thinking. It articulated a vision of the US as unipolar state; 
one that was positioned above and beyond the institutions and rules of the global system 
and as a unipolar provider of global security and order.219 The NSS of 2002 became one 
of the key documents of the Bush Doctrine. Although never formally articulated as such 
by Bush himself, it marked the foreign policy principles of the Bush administration. 
Robert Singh argues that the NSS of 2002 ‘represents as succinct and clear a statement 
of the Doctrine in its multifaceted dimensions as any US government publication that has 
sought to codify a broad foreign policy approach in a single document.’220  
The Bush Doctrine consists of four key elements. The first assumes that the US is 
now the sole super power, which seeks to preserve this hegemonic position for the 
indefinite future.221 This is illustrated by an quote in the NSS of 2002: ‘we must build and 
maintain our defenses beyond challenge.’222 Further adding to this statement later on: 
‘Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a 
military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.’223 
The second element of the Bush Doctrine entails the commitment to the use of 
preemptive military force if and when necessary. It is the most controversial element of 
the Bush Doctrine, due to its policy implications and has received most attention.224 The 
Bush administration saw it as important to eliminate threats before fully materialized. 
The NSS of 2002 states: ‘We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their clients 
before they are able threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United 
States.’225 The NSS identified terrorism as the main threat US national security: ‘The 
United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is 
not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism — 
premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.’226 This threat 
is assumed to originate from two sources. First, there are terrorist groups as al-Qaeda, 
which are assumed to originate in suppressed groups in weak states. Second, there are 
states seeking to develop Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).227 Iraq was seen as such 
a state. The NSS states that the US has irrefutable proof that Iraq’s designs are not only 
limited to chemical weapons but also extend to ‘to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and 
biological agents.’228 The Bush administration sees the ‘pursuit of, and global trade in 
such weapons’ as a ‘looming threat to all nations.’229 Iraq is thus threated as the example 
of a dangerous rogue state that is threatening the entire world. 
The third element is a US unilateralism that is a logical consequence of the 
previous two elements. A commitment to the US as sole superpower and to a doctrine of 
preemptive strike is, as Schmidt and Williams put it, ‘unilateralist to the core.’230 This 
becomes evident in the Bush administration’s national security strategy where it states: 
‘’The United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. 
The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the 
magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, 
do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first.231 Here, the Bush 
administration essentially argues that they do not have the luxury of waiting for a 
potential multilateral solution given the nature and urgency of the threat. The willingness 
of the Bush administration to proceed unilaterally is perhaps no more clearly 
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demonstrated than in its invasion of Iraq. For the decision to invade Iraq the will of much 
of the international community, including the U.N. Security Council, was defied.232 The 
fourth and last element, one which is deeply embedded in American foreign policy 
history, is democracy promotion. The Bush administration views American power as 
representing a force of democratization, which according to them is desired by all people 
and will get behind when they are given the opportunity to do so.233 So, American foreign 
policy should actively be used, sometimes forcibly, to spread democracy. This assumes 
the universality of liberal values and, as mentioned earlier, ‘a single sustainable model 
for national success: freedom, democracy and free enterprise.’ In the NSS it states: ‘We 
will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants.’234    
As Richard Doyle argues, the NSS of 2006 is best viewed as an update of the 
2002 NSS.235 Both security strategies are premised on a critically important assumption 
regarding the role of the US in international security environment, which is stated directly 
in the NSS of 2006: ‘America is at war. This is a wartime national security strategy.’ This 
language is not found in any NSS before 2002.236 As it pertains to Iraq however, there is 
one important difference between the two security documents, namely the fact that Iraq 
is mentioned a lot more in the 2006 Doctrine. When the document of 2002 came out, 
Iraq hadn’t been invaded yet. However in March of 2006, the US had been in Iraq for 
three years. Together with Afghanistan, Iraq was treated as the front line in the War on 
Terror. Winning this war would require winning the battles in Afghanistan and Iraq in 
order to deny terrorists control of a nation, one that they could be used as a base and 
‘launching pad for terror.’237 Interesting is that in the 2006 NSS the Bush administration 
acknowledges that prewar estimates of Iraqi stockpiles of WMD were wrong (which was 
the reason to start the war). It acknowledges its ‘mistake.’ The fact that the Bush 
administration felt compelled to due this is probably due to the growing criticism Bush 
and his administration received on the Iraq war and the continuing US presence in Iraq.  
However, according to the Bush administration it was Saddam’s reckless behavior 
that forced the US to act and that they have no doubt ‘that the world is better off if 
tyrants know that they pursue WMD at their own peril.’ 238 The Bush administration 
argues that the terrorists see Iraq as central in their fight against the US and that the 
terrorists believe that if they defeat the US in Iraq they will prove the US as a waning 
power and unreliable friend. This is why the NSS states: ‘Surrendering to the terrorists 
would likewise hand them a powerful recruiting tool: the perception that they are the 
vanguard of history.’239 In the NSS of 2006 the Bush administration acknowledges the 
challenges it has had, while arguing that since 2002, ‘the world has seen extraordinary 
progress in the expansion of freedom, democracy, and human dignity.’240   
   
Bush Doctrine as grand strategy  
The Bush grand strategy is one of American primacy and unilateralism. It is important to 
note though that an adherence to American primacy predates Bush’s 2002 National 
Security Strategy. In 1992 Paul Wolfowitz drafted a grand strategy to ‘prevent the 
emergence of a new rival.’241 The document drafted by Wolfowitz, in short, advocated 
two things: an unchallenged American hegemony in the world and the use of preemptive 
military force to maintain this position.242 This document was leaked to the press, which 
resulted in a fire-storm of criticism.243 However, Hemmer argues that the 2002 NSS 
radically reprioritized the threats that the US was facing. Terrorists with access to 
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weapons of mass destruction were now the most important threat, and as a result of this 
the US grand strategy had to be directed towards conducting a Global War on Terror.244 
‘The gravest danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and 
technology.’245 Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were 
singled out ‘that eclipsed all other potential threats.246 Hemmer also argues that the new 
grand strategy advocated crusading for US values. Although, from an historical point of 
view, one may object to his use of the term ‘crusading’ but the point he’s making 
concerns the ‘civilizing’ mission of the US, the values of which are not only triumphant 
but also offer the ‘single sustainable model for national success.’247 As it was stated by 
Bush: ‘The United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of 
freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, 
development, free markets, and free trade to the corners of the world.’248  
Not only did the Bush administration have confidence in the universality and 
efficacy of US values. It also believed that history was on America’s side.249 In the NSS of 
2006 it states: ‘The 20th century witnessed the triumph of freedom over the threats of 
fascism and communism. Yet a new totalitarian ideology now threatens, an ideology 
grounded not in secular philosophy but in the perversion of a proud religion. Its content 
may be different from the ideologies of the last century, but its means are similar: 
intolerance, murder, terror, enslavement, and repression.’250 In relation to this, the Bush 
administration argued that although history was on the side of America, time wasn’t. 
That the US would be better off confronting potential threats sooner rather than later was 
central to its case for ‘preemptive war.’ In the light of the attacks of 9/11, Bush argued 
that it was better to act ‘too early than waiting until it was too late.’251 
  
Obama: ‘Dumb War’ 
Before I delve into Obama’s rhetoric regarding US presence in Iraq, it is important to first 
look at Obama’s earlier opinions regarding the Iraq war and how this helped him to 
become the nominee of the Democratic Party. Popular support for the Iraq War had 
decreased significantly during the Bush presidency. The monthly average of support for 
the war dropped from 73% in April of 2003 to 33% by the end of the Bush presidency 
five years later.252 As Americans became more and more disenchanted with the war, they 
also soured on its architect. In the same time period, Bush’s monthly approval ratings fell 
from 71% to 28%. As Bush and the war became increasingly unpopular, so did the 
Republican party. During the period from the first half of 2003 to the second half of 
2008, the mean proportion of American rating the party favorably fell from 55% to 41%, 
while the Democratic Party favorability ratings grew from 52% to 55%.253 Popular 
reaction had tilted the political field strongly in the Democrats favor.  
In the race for becoming the nominee of the Democratic Party, Obama went up 
against the vastly more known and experienced Hillary Clinton. However Clinton had 
voted to authorize the war, whereas Obama had been opposed to it from the start. 
Clinton also represented continuity with the Democratic past, while Obama represented 
change, also the focal point of his campaign.254 As early as October of 2002, more than 
one and half year before the actual invasion, Obama made his case against the Iraq War. 
In a speech given in Chicago Obama argued:  
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What I am opposed to is a dumb war. What I am opposed to is a rash war. What I 
am opposed to is the cynical attempt by Richard Perle an Paul Wolfowitz and other 
armchair, weekend warriors in this administration to shove their own ideological 
agendas down our throats, irrespective of the costs in lives lost and in hardship 
borne.255  
 
Obama’s Chicago speech, which would become an important part of his presidential 
campaign, made clear that he wasn’t opposed to all wars. He was adamantly opposed to 
a war in Iraq, which would be ‘a war based not on reason but on passion, not on principle 
but on politics.’256 Obama saw the war in Iraq as a mistake, even before the US had 
invaded Iraq.  
Over the years leading up to Obama’s presidency, his view, as can be expected, 
would not become more favorable regarding the war. In an op-ed titled ‘my plan for Iraq’ 
leading up to presidential elections Obama stated:  
 
I believed it was a grave mistake to allow ourselves to be distracted from the fight 
against Al Qaeda and the Taliban by invading a country that posed no imminent 
threat and had nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks. Since then, more than 4,000 
Americans have died and we have spent nearly $1 trillion. Our military is 
overstretched. Yearly the threat we face from Afghanistan to Al Qaeda to Iran has 
grown.257 
 
Obama’s view regarding the Iraq war leading up to his presidency had consistently been 
one of opposition. This opposition served him well in his campaign for president. 
Jacobsen argues that ‘the Iraq War was, through direct and indirect pathways, ultimately 
the single most contributor to Obama’s presidential victory.’258      
 
Obama’s National Security Strategies 
When comparing the national security strategies from Obama’s administrations with 
those of the Bush administrations, it is important to point out that new administrations 
never start from a blank slate. It is always possible to identify similarities and continuities 
between an administration and its predecessors. Hemmer argues that no US grand 
strategy will be completely novel.259 Still, although this applies to all US presidents, 
Obama wasn’t just inheriting a series of commitments, he was inheriting a relatively 
novel set of commitments.260 Obama argued that he had ‘to carefully find his spot 
between existing commitments.’261 
 Hemmer argues that Obama inherited a ‘floundering economy, a bleak fiscal 
situation, a war on terror, and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.262 This is exemplified by 
Obama’s NSS of 2010, which started with a recognition of the weaknesses he had 
inherited. Where Bush spoke of ‘unprecedented— and unequaled— strength and influence 
in the world.’263 Obama argues that ‘the burden of a young century cannot fall on 
American shoulders alone.’ He also states: ‘our strategy starts by recognizing that our 
strength and influence abroad begins with the steps we take at home. We must grow our 
economy and reduce our deficit.’264 The strategy was focused on renewing American 
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leadership by building a stronger foundation for American leadership because, ‘what 
takes place within our borders will determine our strength and influence beyond them.’265  
 Kaufman argues that in rhetoric Obama’s NSS embraced his predecessors’ goal of 
a freer world, but that it shunned moralistic verbiage.266 The NSS of 2010 states: ‘In all 
that we do, we will advocate for and advance the basic rights upon which our nation was 
founded, and which peoples of e race and religion have made their own. We promote 
these values by living them, including our commitment to the rule of law.’267 This 
presents a stark contrast with the Bush administration’s approach of US values as the 
single sustainable model for success, which had to be exported if necessary by force. The 
Obama administration argued for ‘an international order advanced by US leadership.’268 
The quote also signifies a change in approach. Where the Bush administration chose to 
adopt an approach of unilateralism and American primacy, Obama opted for a more 
multilateral approach for his grand strategy. Obama argued that ‘the problems we 
confront…can’t be solved by just one country.’269 Hemmer argues that part of what drove 
the Obama administration towards multilateralism was the realization of the limited 
resources of the US270 In the 2010 NSS it states: ‘our national security goals can only be 
reached if we make hard choices and work with international partners to share 
burdens.’271 According to Hemmer, the Obama administration’s focus on multilateralism 
presented the starkest distinction in Obama’s foreign policy approached compared to 
Bush’s foreign policy approach.272 The NSS of 2010 did mention the caveat that ‘the 
United States must reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary.’273 
 Another significant modification in Obama’s US grand strategy was to downplay 
the centrality of the War on Terror. John Brennan, adviser on counterterrorism for the 
Obama administration, explains: ‘the fight against terrorists and violent extremists has 
been returned to its right and proper place: no longer defining— indeed, distorting— our 
entire national security and foreign policy, but rather serving as a vital part of those 
larger policies.’274 Obama also wanted to change the narrative of Bush’s global War on 
Terror. In a memo sent out to staff members, at the beginning of his presidency, it 
notes: ‘this administration prefers to avoid using the term ‘Long War’ or ‘Global War on 
Terror.’ Please use ‘Overseas Contingency Operation.’275 Afghanistan and Iraq were no 
longer linked together as one Global War on Terror. Obama now speaks of ‘two wars’ in 
which the US is involved.276  
  Obama rejected Bush’s notion of rogue states and terrorist groups, which were 
used to justify the war in Iraq. Obama identifies a specific enemy. The NSS of 2010 
states, ‘this is not a global war against a tactic— terrorism or religion— Islam. We are at 
war with a specific network, al-Qa’ida, and its terrorist affiliates who support to attack 
the United States, our allies, and partners.’277 The war is thus marketed different than 
under the Bush administration. However in practice little changed. Hemmer argues that 
the inclusion of al-Qa’ída ‘affiliates’ meant that this definition omitted few terrorist 
groups.278 In relation to this, Gray argues that in substance there seems to be little 
change. She argues that Obama’s approach ‘looks like a continuation of Bush’s policy 
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that the ‘War on Terror’ should be pursued by military means.’279 The NSS of 2010 
states, ‘For nearly a decade, our nation has been at war with a far-reaching network of 
violence and hatred.’280 Obama accepted the Bush administration’s notion that the 
growing destructiveness of modern weapons combined with a new type of enemy, forced 
the US to pursue a new set of foreign policy instruments.281 Or, as Obama states: ‘after 
9/11, we knew that we had entered a new era – that enemies who did not abide by any 
law of war would present new challenges to our application of the law; that our 
government would need new tools to protect the American people, and that these tools 
would have to allow us to prevent attacks instead of simply prosecuting those who try to 
carry them out.’282 Following from this, Obama is suspiciously quiet on the use of 
preemptive force. While the 2010 NSS does contain an NSS titled ‘use of force’, it does 
not mention the preemptive use of force. Warren and Bode argue that this suggests a 
silent continuation of Bush’s preemptive use-of-force policy.283 The 2015 NSS only 
mentions it once indirectly, where it states that the aim is to ‘work to prevent, and if 
necessary, respond to mass atrocities.’284 Hemmer argues that, although Obama saw the 
preventive war against Iraq as a mistake, the Obama administration remained convinced 
of the value of using direct force, such as drone strikes, against specific terrorist groups. 
He also didn’t want to take the preventive war option of the table.285 
One major difference in Obama’s and Bush’s foreign policy marketing is the 
importance attributed to Iraq in their grand strategy. Where Bush sees Iraq as central in 
the war against terrorism, Obama sees Afghanistan and Pakistan as the frontline of the 
fight against al-Qa’ida.286 Moreover, Obama sees terrorism as one of the dangers the US 
faces instead of treating it, as the Bush administration did, as the decisive ideological 
struggle. Then, Obama wanted to move away from ‘fighting costly, large scale ground 
wars.’ In the NSS of 2015 it states, ‘Six years ago, there were roughly 180,000 US 
troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Today, there are fewer than 15,000. This transition has 
dramatically reduced US casualties and allows us to realign our forces and resources to 
meet an evolving set of threats while securing our strategic objectives.’287 The Obama 
administration wanted to pursue a more sustainable approach that ‘prioritizes 
counterterrorism operations , collective action with responsible partners, and increased 
efforts to prevent the growth of violent extremism and radicalization that drives 
increased threats.288 Hemmer argues that Obama uses the language of America as a 
‘beacon’ or ‘light’ as opposed to Bush’s ‘crusader’ tone.289 This suggests only difference. 
Yet, what are the continuities and differences, in the end? 
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4. Conclusion 
 
I set out to test Pieterse’s notion of neoliberal empire by analyzing whether the concept 
holds up when examined from the perspective of the Obama presidency, by means of a 
case study. Pieterse saw a transition taking place, under the Bush presidency, from 
neoliberal globalization to neoliberal empire; from a system based on rules to a system 
based on (market) power. This new hybrid form of empire merged neoliberalism with 
empire. I’ve examined whether the continuation and divergence between the Bush and 
Obama presidency, from a privatization and marketing perspective, would suggest a 
continuation of the concept of neoliberal empire and thus show its viability.       
Pieterse argues that the US’ shift to combat mode in the wake of 9/11 facilitated 
an authoritarian concentration of power, silencing criticism under the widening umbrella 
of ‘security’. Neoliberal practices now extended to security and war. In relation to this, 
I’ve found that under the Bush presidency private military contractors were used on a 
therefore unprecedented scale, providing the Bush administration with increased capacity 
and flexibility, without having to lose political capital, but also leading to less 
accountability and obscuring the full human cost of war. Under Obama the reliance on 
PMSC’s in Iraq continued, and even though actual number of U.S troops decreased, 
Obama’s reliance on PMSC’s increased. So, the politics of military privatization continued 
under Obama. Under Bush and later Obama, PMSC’s have profited of the Iraq war, while 
affecting foreign policy and obscuring the border between the government and private 
parties. This confirms Pieterse’s notion of war as a matter of business in a neoliberal 
empire. The private military industry has become the ultimate enabler for U.S. 
presidents, allowing operations that might otherwise be politically impossible.  
Under the Bush presidency Iraq was carefully marketed as a blow for freedom. 
Pieterse argues that neoliberal warfare comes with ‘marketing campaigns worthy of 
corporate causes.’ The Bush administration created a Global War on Terror narrative, in 
which the war in Iraq was framed as a crucial part. For Bush’s grand strategy the Global 
War on Terror was its defining center. The Bush administration believed in an efficacy 
and universality of US values, which should be spread, by military means if necessary. 
Obama’s narrative regarding Iraq was very different, labeling it as ‘dumb war’ before he 
became president. In Obama’s grand strategy terrorism was regarded as just one of the 
security challenges the US faced. The Obama administration didn’t want to speak of a 
Global War on Terror and didn’t want to place Iraq in such a narrative. Obama also 
rejected the notion of rogue states and nations and identified al-Qa’ida as a specific 
enemy. The Obama administration emphasized a multilateral approach, where the Bush 
administration was marked by unilateralism. Still, continuity between the Bush and 
Obama presidency showed itself in the Obama administration’s silence regarding the use 
of preemptive force policy, which suggests a continuation of Bush’s use of force policy. 
The Obama administration also continued the war against terrorism by military means.   
 Under Obama US global military presence and power projection took a different 
form. Obama wanted to move away from large scale ground wars, in a desire to pursue a 
more sustainable approach of counterterrorism, using a different rhetoric but applying 
notions of the Bush doctrine, still, whilst making using of military outsourcing. How does 
this affect Pieterse’s notion of neoliberal empire?   
 My research, although limited in that it only examines two characteristics of 
neoliberal empire, would suggest that, although Obama employed a different rhetoric and 
foreign policy marketing, he was either unwilling or unable to change polices from Bush’s 
presidency. Obama didn’t change the reliance on the private sector in the military sphere 
and stayed quiet on the use of preemptive military force, which placed the US outside 
international law. A system for American exceptionalism was put in place under the Bush 
administration. This may have taken a different shape under Obama but underlying 
continuities remain, suggesting a different packaging for neoliberal empire. In other 
words neoliberal empire is marketed different, but its contents remain.  
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